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8 April 1966

THE IMPACT OF CHINESE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE PAKISTAN-INDIAN DISPUTE

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USAWC RESEARCH ELEMENT
(Thesis)

The Impact of Chinese Development of
Nuclear Weapons
on the Pakistan-Indian Dispute

by

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8 April 1966

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SUMMARY

The Indian-Pakistan dispute began over a thousand years ago with the Moslem invasion of India. It is both religious and cultural and sharpened with the British seizure of India, which advanced the Hindu politically.

The partition of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan was a result of the animosity between the Hindus and the Moslems. The partition itself resulted in a number of disputes: communal riots that left a million dead, refugees, division of the old Indian Army, monetary problems, the Canal Waters dispute, and territorial disputes over various princely states.

Basically, however, the dispute between these two neighbors is the question of their continued existence as nations. Pakistan fears attack by India, while India fears that any accommodation with Moslem Pakistan will result in the disintegration of a secular India.

The most famous problem, and the only significant one remaining, is the question of the accession of Kashmir to India. Moslem Kashmir has come to represent to Pakistan the willingness of India to accept Pakistan's existence and live in peace with it. On the other hand Kashmir represents to India the question of whether or not India is truly a secular state; thus, Kashmir symbolizes the basic fear and distrust that exist between the two nations.

Until 1962 India and Pakistan were primarily concerned with each other, but in that year the invasion of India's borders by China presented India with a new enemy, who in 1964 became the first Asian member of the nuclear powers. India, capable of developing its own nuclear device in 12 to 18 months, was now faced with the problem of how to counter this growing Chinese threat.

If India chooses to rely on the protection of the US and the USSR against Chinese nuclear blackmail rather than develop its own weapons, tension should not heighten between India and Pakistan and may even lessen with the show of good will that such a decision would provide.

There is a great deal of pressure in India to develop nuclear weapons, however, so that India would have the prestige of being a nuclear power and at the same time not be dependent on the major powers in the event of a nuclear war with China. The heavy pressure seems to make a decision to develop a nuclear device almost certain; the drain on the economy of a full nuclear force including delivery systems together with internal and international political problems would indicate that a device for "peaceful" uses would best suit India's needs.

Even a "peaceful" device would force Pakistan to look for ways of countering an India with nuclear arms, since the capability would be there. Pakistan would be faced with a need for military protection on one hand that would be best satisfied by an alliance with China against the common enemy, while on the other hand Pakistan's need of economic assistance, so vital to its future, would point toward close relations with the US.

Initially, Pakistan should attempt to maintain good relations with the US while also being friendly with China. Thereafter, whether Pakistan would move toward China or not would be determined by the relations of the US and India with Pakistan. US policies which fail to recognize Pakistan's need for security and which make the need for military protection seem more important than economic assistance will force Pakistan to rely on China more fully. Such a course could bring about the downfall of CENTO and SEATO and result in the economic failure of both India and Pakistan, signaling an end to democracy on the subcontinent and much of the underdeveloped world.

CHAPTER I

THE INDO-PAKISTANI DISPUTE

The short, savage war which erupted in and around Kashmir in August 1965 began generations ago in the 8th Century when Muhammed bin Qasim marched into Sind.¹ Later in the 16th Century the last Mogul invasion of India took place.² For more than 200 years afterward, these Moslem Moguls ruled Northern India.³ Then about 1760 a new master was found for the entire subcontinent of India--the British.

The coming of the British with their democratic form of government had a peculiar impact on the Moslem-Hindu relationship in India.⁴ It completely reversed their roles in government.⁵ The Hindu, being more receptive to the impact of Western education, made the most of his new advantage to secure a lead in the administration of India that he never lost.⁶ The Moslem, in turn, was politically depressed and soon became culturally isolated.⁷ The Moslems were embittered toward the Hindu and were distrustful of them as British puppets.⁸

¹John E. Frazer, "Kashmir: Tinderbox of Asia," Readers Digest, Vol. 87, Dec. 1965, p. 91.

²"Ending the Suspense," Time, Vol. 86, 17 Sep. 1965, p. 46.

³Ronald Harker, "Centuries War in Kashmir," Washington Post, 12 Sep. 1965, p. E1.

⁴Aslam Siddiqi, Pakistan Seeks Security, p. 3.

⁵Harker, *op. cit.*

⁶*Ibid.*

⁷Evarice C. Mire, India vs. Pakistan: The Roots of Dispute and Possible Courses of US Action, p. 16.

The final outcome was a hatred between the two groups that was cultural as well as religious.⁸

India's hatred of the newly formed Pakistan in many ways resembles that of the Arab states toward Israel,⁹ while Pakistan fears encirclement and conquest by the larger, more powerful India.¹⁰ The result is a wasting and seemingly incurable quarrel between the two countries that threatens their joint security and economic growth.¹¹

As India pressed forward toward freedom from Britain early in the 20th Century, the gulf between Hindu and Moslem widened, principally because of the Moslem fear of perpetual domination by the Hindu majority in India.¹² In 1940 the Moslem League, the spokesman for India's Moslems, adopted the concept of a separate Moslem nation.¹³ However, the plan for partition of India was not announced until 3 June 1947, only two months before partition of the subcontinent into the nations of India and Pakistan was to take place.¹⁴ Ever since partition, relations between the two countries have been strained.¹⁵

⁸"Ending the Suspense," Time, Vol. 86, 17 Sep. 1965, p. 46.

⁹Harker, op. cit., p. E4.

¹⁰Muhammed Ayub, "The Foreign Policy of Pakistan," Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 17, 1st Qtr 1964, p. 19.

¹¹"Kashmir Again," Washington Post, 18 Aug. 1965, p. A18.

¹²Frazer, op. cit., p. 92.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Stanley Y. Kennedy, Jr., Kashmir Dispute--Appropriate Role of the United States, p. 7.

Fundamentally, the dispute between India and Pakistan is the fear by each that its national viability is threatened by the other, although this fear is manifestly different in the two countries.

Pakistan has not yet reached the point where it can be sure of its own continued existence. It has overwhelming internal problems, compounded by hostility from India. At the same time Afghanistan has laid claim to Pakistani territory, while the USSR has in the past been unfriendly.¹⁶ Fear and hostility toward India are almost universal in Pakistan.¹⁷ Although Pakistan's almost total preoccupation with India has its basis in the centuries of Hindu-Moslem antagonism,¹⁸ this preoccupation is expressed in the fear that India intends to destroy Pakistan, as voiced recently by President Ayub: "The Indian rulers were never reconciled to the establishment of an independent Pakistan where Moslems could build a homeland of their own. For 18 years they have been arming to crush us."¹⁹

Since India is four times as large as Pakistan and has about 10 times the industrial potential,²⁰ as well as possessing armed forces about four times as large,²¹ Pakistan recognizes that what

¹⁶George C. Denney, "China-Pakistan Relations: The By-Product of Other Processes," Institute of Current World Affairs, 19 Mar. 1963, p. 1.

¹⁷Mire, op. cit., p. iii.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹"Ending the Suspense," Time, Vol. 86, 17 Sep. 1965, p. 45.

²⁰Siddiqi, op. cit., p. 16.

²¹"India Possesses the Larger Army," New York Times, 7 Sep. 1965, p. 20.

India does will determine Pakistan's existence.²² As a result of this fear, Pakistan has five of its seven divisions arrayed against an attack by India.²³ Pakistan believes that India's ultimate goal is to conquer the entire subcontinent by force.²⁴ This sentiment was perhaps best expressed by a Pakistani official, who said during the recent war: "Let's fight it out and get it over with. Either we become slaves of India, or India accepts us as an independent state. This suspense must end."²⁵

India, on the other hand, does not have the fear of being destroyed by external attack by Pakistan. Rather India's fear is the profound doubt that the cohesion of India can in the long run endure.²⁶ The issue in India is whether it is a secular or a religious state.²⁷ With nearly 50 million Moslems within its borders as well as a number of other religious groups, such as Sikhs,²⁸ admission that India was a Hindu state would threaten the precarious unity of the country²⁹ and might cause Madras or other states to attempt to secede.³⁰

The roots of this dispute reach back centuries before the partition of the two countries and the formation of Pakistan.³¹

²² Denney, op. cit., p. 9.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ "Ending the Suspense," Time, Vol. 86, 17 Sep. 1965, p. 46.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 44.

²⁶ Walter Lippmann, "Breakdown in South Asia," Washington Post, 16 Sep. 1965, p. A21.

²⁷ Kennedy, op. cit., p. 21.

²⁸ Frazer, op. cit., p. 96.

²⁹ Lippmann, op. cit.

³⁰ "Ending the Suspense," Time, Vol. 86, 17 Sep. 1965, p. 46.

³¹ Harker, op. cit.

Although these roots are basically along religious lines,³² they are also a result of the geography of the subcontinent,³³ particularly its river pattern; the Hindu caste system; the Moslem seclusion of their women; race; history; and cultural backgrounds.³⁴

The two religions have a number of specific contrasts which cause friction and dissension between them. The Hindu worships idols, while the Moslem has none. The Hindu venerated his sacred cows, while the Moslem eats beef. The Hindu enforced a strong caste system, while the Moslem believes in the equality of all persons. The Hindu uses Sanskrit letters, while the Moslem uses Arabic.³⁵

Another major source of misunderstanding is the failure of each to read the literature of the other, resulting in a lack of communication.³⁶

These conflicts between the Hindu and Moslem religions became the single most important root of the dispute and ultimately led to the formation of Pakistan³⁷ and to the conflict over Kashmir.

As a result of the animosity between the Hindu and the Moslem and of the short time between the announcement of partition and the actual creation of Pakistan, a number of initial disputes developed between Pakistan and India. These disputes included

³²Mire, op. cit., p. 15.

³³Ibid., p. 1.

³⁴Gerald L. Steibel, "The Strange Story of India and Pakistan," The American Legion Magazine, Vol. 79, Dec. 1965, p. 8.

³⁵Kennedy, op. cit., p. 20.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Mire, op. cit., p. 7.

the following:³⁸ communal riots and mass genocide that left as many as a million dead;³⁹ refugees on the order of 11 to 16 million;⁴⁰ the division of the old Indian Army and of its military stores, which resulted in many broken promises by India and created great distrust in Pakistan;⁴¹ territorial disputes over a number of the princely states, such as Junagadh, Manavadar, and Hyderabad;⁴² monetary problems, particularly those surrounding the devaluation of the Indian rupee when the British pound was devalued in 1949;⁴³ and the Canal Waters dispute, which came to a head in 1948 when India cut off water supplies to the canals supplying much of the water to West Pakistan.⁴⁴

In the years since partition, the specific issues between India and Pakistan have been settled one by one, except for the problem of Kashmir, which continues to be the largest single factor preventing accord between the two nations.⁴⁵ This Kashmir dispute, a brief history of which is at annex A, has had several adverse effects:

1. It has precluded good relations between India and Pakistan, creating instead distrust and fear.⁴⁶

³⁸Ibid., p. iii.

³⁹Frazer, op. cit., p. 92.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Mire, op. cit., p. 30.

⁴²Harker, op. cit., p. E4.

⁴³Mire, op. cit., p. 38.

⁴⁴Siddiqi, op. cit., p. 173.

⁴⁵Kennedy, op. cit., p. iii.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 4.

2. It has caused both sides to maintain expensive armies on the cease-fire line.⁴⁷

3. It has precluded mutual defense arrangements for the subcontinent.⁴⁸

4. It has impaired regional stability.⁴⁹

5. It has impeded economic progress in both countries.⁵⁰

6. It has marred the posture of the UN.⁵¹

At the time when partition of the subcontinent was being worked out, Kashmir was of little importance because India, Pakistan, and the UK all thought that it would accede to Moslem Pakistan,⁵² since more than 75% of the population was Moslem⁵³ and since the state was closely aligned with Pakistan both geographically, economically, and strategically.^{54, 55}

The Hindu ruler of Kashmir, however, when under heavy pressure from Moslem tribesmen, acceded to India in exchange for Indian military forces to put down the rebellion.⁵⁶ Pakistan in turn introduced its forces into Kashmir,⁵⁷ resulting in a war that lasted until the UN brought about a cease-fire in 1949,⁵⁸ an agreement that included

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Pakistan Embassy, Information Division, Peril and Opportunity in Kashmir--Background Report, p. 9.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Lippmann, op. cit.

⁵³Mire, op. cit., p. 47.

⁵⁴Siddiqi, op. cit., p. 164.

⁵⁵Kennedy, op. cit., pp. 21-22.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 14.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 27.

⁵⁸"Ending the Suspense," Time, Vol. 86, 17 Sep. 1965, p. 46.

a provision for a plebiscite in Kashmir and that was accepted by both India and Pakistan.⁵⁹ Four times the UN ordered a plebiscite held; but, although Nehru once vowed to "abide by the will of the Kashmiri people," India always found reasons to avoid the plebiscite--because they would lose it.^{60, 61}

Pakistan demands a plebiscite in Kashmir, based on three arguments:⁶² first, since Kashmir was not part of India at the time of independence, the Kashmiri have a right of self-determination; second, India originally agreed to the plebiscite; third, the UN resolutions should be carried out.

India, on the other hand, has a number of specific reasons for not wanting a plebiscite:⁶³

1. Kashmir would favor Pakistan almost certainly.
2. Other areas in India, such as Kerala, might demand plebiscites leading to their independence.
3. Hindus might riot against the Moslems now living in India, bringing back the horror of partition days.
4. A critical rallying point for Indian unity as a nation would disappear.

⁵⁹Kennedy, op. cit., p. 28.

⁶⁰"Ending the Suspense," Time, Vol. 86, 17 Sep. 1965, p. 46.

⁶¹Rowland Evans, and Robert Novak, "Cataclysm in Asia," Washington Post, 13 Sep. 1965, p. A21.

⁶²US Dept of Defense, "India and Pakistan: Crisis in South Asia," For Commanders: This Changing World, Vol. 5, 1 Oct. 1965, p. 2.

⁶³Denney, op. cit., p. 11.

In short, India, occupying the Vale and Jammu, which are productive,⁶⁴ is satisfied with the current arrangement of territory and would have little to gain and much to lose in any negotiation.⁶⁵

So the arguments boil down to Pakistan, wanting change, contending that the accession of Kashmir to India was not legal, while India, wanting status quo, contends that accession was legal and final.

The Kashmir problem, relatively simple when it began, has taken on great importance over the years until today it is a highly emotional one,⁶⁶ having blown up into an issue of life and death between India and Pakistan.⁶⁷ Kashmir has become the key issue in any Pakistan-Indian peace,⁶⁸ because it has come to symbolize and to make concrete the mutual distrust of the Hindus and the Moslems and their fear that the settlement of 1947, which created the two nations, cannot endure in the long run.⁶⁹

While India fears that accession of Kashmir to Pakistan now would undermine India's secular foundations⁷⁰ and its unity,⁷¹ Pakistan considers settlement of Kashmir as the prime test of India's willingness to let Pakistan exist as a separate nation.⁷² In

⁶⁴Mire, op. cit., p. 75.

⁶⁵Kennedy, op. cit., p. 36.

⁶⁶"Ending the Suspense," Time, Vol. 86, 17 Sep. 1965, p. 46.

⁶⁷Lippmann, op. cit.

⁶⁸Denney, op. cit., p. 10.

⁶⁹Lippmann, op. cit.

⁷⁰Selig S. Harrison, "India, Pakistan at Crisis in Dispute Over Kashmir," Washington Post, 2 Sep. 1965, p. A20.

⁷¹Lippmann, op. cit.

⁷²Denney, op. cit., p. 10.

Pakistan's view, the Hindus have never accepted Pakistan's existence and only by winning freedom for Kashmir can Pakistan feel secure from Indian attack;⁷³ and, until then, India is more of a threat than Communist China.⁷⁴

Pakistan undoubtedly sees continued inactivity as working against its interests. As early as 1954, Nehru announced that Kashmir was an integral part of India.⁷⁵ In the past two years India has become increasingly defiant and intransigent over Kashmir, eroding its special status by extending the jurisdiction of Indian courts, jailing plebiscite leaders, and suppressing opposition papers.⁷⁶ Then Shastri in 1965 began the takeover of administration by Indian civil servants, trying to close the Kashmir question.⁷⁷ At the same time the Indian stand was summarized by its special representative to the UN, Mahomed Ali Currim Changla, when he said: "We will not agree to a plebiscite because Kashmir is an integral part of India."⁷⁸

Frustrated at every turn and seeing Kashmir slip away, Pakistan last summer attempted to stir up the Kashmiri people, only to have

⁷³Harrison, op. cit.

⁷⁴US Dept of Defense, "India and Pakistan: Crisis in South Asia," For Commanders: This Changing World, Vol. 5, 1 Oct. 1965, p. 2.

⁷⁵"Ending the Suspense," Time, Vol. 86, 17 Sep. 1965, p. 48.

⁷⁶Sharif al-Mujahid, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Analysis," NATO's Fifteen Nations, Vol. 10, Oct.-Nov. 1965, p. 35.

⁷⁷"Ending the Suspense," Time, Vol. 86, 17 Sep. 1965, p. 48.

⁷⁸Richard Halloran, "Rival Envoys Firm on Kashmir, See No Compromise Possible," Washington Post, 13 Sep. 1965, p. A16.

this activity erupt into armed conflict between Pakistan and India in August, causing a serious threat to world peace.⁷⁹ By the end of September the cease-fire had been reestablished,⁸⁰ but it appears at this time that neither side has the will and resources to fight to a showdown nor the political strength at home to make the concessions which a compromise would require.⁸¹

In summary, the basic dispute between India and Pakistan is the question of their continued existence as nations; but this dispute over the years has become focused on Kashmir as a symbol, a symbol which Pakistan feels must pass to it if India is to show its willingness to live in peace. However, India feels that Kashmir cannot be given up without endangering the very unity of India.

Failure to solve this dispute between these two neighbors will have far-reaching effects:⁸²

1. It will aggravate their bitterness.
2. It will heighten mutual fears and suspicions.
3. It will force an arms race.
4. It will increase economic burdens in each country.
5. It will divert scarce resources to military needs.
6. It will slow economic growth so vitally needed.
7. It will create popular discontent.

⁷⁹US Dept of Defense, "India and Pakistan: Crisis in South Asia," For Commanders: This Changing World, Vol. 5, 1 Oct. 1965, p. 1.

⁸⁰Ibid.

⁸¹Walter Lippmann, "The Grand-Slam Showdown," Washington Post, 21 Sep. 1965, p. A17.

⁸²Ayub Khan, "The Pakistan-American Alliance," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 42, Jan. 1964, p. 209.

CHAPTER 2

PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

A nation's foreign policy must be first a policy of survival with preservation of ideology and economic development as concomitant objectives.¹

From the beginning of its existence, Pakistan's foreign policy has been based on its fear of India.² This is the underlying element of Pakistan's action, but at the same time, President Ayub has recently reaffirmed the desire of his country to maintain friendly relations with all its neighboring states, based on mutual respect and the integrity of Pakistan's borders.³

Another element in Pakistan's foreign policy is its ties to the other Moslem countries. Pakistan's first instinct as a new nation was to establish ties with these countries,⁴ and Pakistan is still convinced that its destiny lies with them rather than with India.⁵

Closely related to all these elements is the question of Kashmir, on which the Pakistani place great importance,⁶ as discussed in chapter 1. As a result of the emphasis given to Kashmir, Pakistan

¹ Sharif al-Mujahid, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Analysis," NATO's Fifteen Nations, Vol. 10, Oct.-Nov. 1965, p. 33.

² "Ending the Suspense," Time, Vol. 86, 17 Sep. 1965, p. 46.

³ John F. Kennedy, and Ayub Khan, "Joint Communique," Dept of State Bulletin, Vol. 45, 7 Aug. 1961, p. 24.

⁴ Muhammed Ayub, "The Foreign Policy of Pakistan," Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 17, 1st Qtr 1964, p. 19.

⁵ Aslam Siddiqi, Pakistan Seeks Security, p. 102.

⁶ Kennedy, op. cit.

has tended to consider the central issue in its relations with other nations to be their position on the Kashmir question.⁷

Starting with a fear of India, Pakistan's hatred of its neighbor has grown over the years, principally as a result of the bloody episodes during partition and of the Indian refusal to resolve the Kashmir dispute.⁸ In addition, the increased military power of India causes worries in Pakistan:⁹ first, because added strength may permit India to intimidate Pakistan and, second, because India would be less willing to settle the Kashmir issue on a basis that the Pakistani would consider fair and just. The more impregnable India feels, the more arrogant it can be to Pakistan.¹⁰

Basically, Pakistan was much weaker than India when the two countries were created. In order to redress the balance, Pakistan needed outside assistance. Pakistan was, and still is, willing to accept aid from any quarter in order to remain free of India.¹¹

This was not a simple matter, however. The Moslem countries did not have the means to support Pakistan. The USSR had the means but Pakistan feared its intentions in the area, for early in World War II, the USSR had shown interest in expanding to Karachi and

⁷Werner Levi, "Pakistan, the Soviet Union, and China," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 37, Fall 1962, p. 222.

⁸George C. Denney, "China-Pakistan Relations: The By-Product of Other Processes," Institute of Current World Affairs, 19 Mar. 1963, p. 1.

⁹Ayub, op. cit., p. 23.

¹⁰Denney, op. cit., p. 9.

¹¹Ibid.

getting a port on the Indian Ocean.¹² In addition to its desire for a warm water port, the USSR's size, power, and ideology worried Pakistan.¹³ Lastly, China was just coming out of its civil war. Moreover, India had made it clear that it wanted Chinese friendship; so, until 1962, attempting to use China against India did not offer much promise.¹⁴

With Europe still struggling back from the war, only the US could supply the needed modern equipment to Pakistan.¹⁵ This aid, however, carried a price with it--alliance with the US. So today the US and Pakistan are linked in four arrangements:¹⁶ SEATO, CENTO, Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, and a bilateral Agreement of Cooperation. Initially the advantages of a sense of security, large scale economic aid, and US military aid¹⁷ offset the disadvantages of being cut off to some extent from nonaligned nations and of antagonizing the USSR.¹⁸ Despite the fact that Pakistan had joined with the US chiefly as protection against India,¹⁹ there was no guarantee against attack from non-Communist states such as India.²⁰ In short, in exchange for aid, Pakistan accepted the Cold War risks as an ally of the US.²¹

¹²Siddiqi, op. cit., p. 35.

¹³Ibid., p. 38.

¹⁴Denney, op. cit., p. 9.

¹⁵Siddiqi, op. cit., p. 64.

¹⁶Ayub Khan, "The Pakistan-American Alliance," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 42, Jan. 1964, p. 195.

¹⁷Muhammed Ayub, op. cit., p. 22.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Mujahid, op. cit., p. 34.

²⁰Muhammed Ayub, op. cit., p. 22.

²¹Denney, op. cit., p. 1.

As the years moved on, Pakistan was surprised to note that the US sought out India and gave it massive economic aid even while India was castigating the US in the UN and elsewhere.²² After 1960 the shift in US attitude toward India became more noticeable.²³ While the USSR continually supported India on Kashmir, the US progressively changed its position to the disadvantage of Pakistan, its ally.²⁴ Further, the US provided India with a great amount of indirect military aid through US economic aid which permitted India to divert its own resources to military goods.²⁵ At the same time, the US premise that India really was more important to US interests than Pakistan became known to the Pakistani.²⁶

Beginning in 1961 Pakistan's support of its Western allies began to erode because of shifts in the worldwide East-West struggle:²⁷

1. Neutralism became acceptable even to the US.
2. US need for foreign bases was decreasing rapidly.
3. US Government seemed to take on a pro-Indian flavor.
4. US advocated neutralism for Laos, hurting SEATO.

After the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962, the US gave India direct military aid. This arming of India was considered by Pakistan

²²Muhammed Ayub, op. cit., p. 23.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ayub Khan, op. cit., p. 198.

²⁵Ibid., p. 199.

²⁶Denney, op. cit., p. 13.

²⁷Mujahid, op. cit., p. 35.

to be a serious threat to its security.²⁸ Even though India gave assurances, backed by the US, that US arms would not be used against Pakistan, these assurances carried no conviction to the Pakistani.²⁹ As a result, in 1963 Pakistan made clear to the US that it considered the increased US military aid to India as a betrayal of an ally.³⁰ In Pakistan's view, increased military assistance to India by the US has enabled India to defy the UN on Kashmir and to integrate Kashmir into India.³¹ Moreover, Pakistan feels that aid to India should have been timed with a Kashmir settlement.³²

While its relations with the US were deteriorating, Pakistan found that its position with respect to India also was worsening. Fear of attack from India had become the most crucial determinant not only of Pakistan's foreign policy but also of its internal policies and politics.³³ Within India there were parties pledged to reuniting the two countries and even Nehru talked of a confederation between them.³⁴ India announced plans to double the number of divisions in its army, which led President Ayub to feel that India was planning to raise two armies--one against China and one against Pakistan.³⁵ India also expanded its Navy, though China is not a

²⁸Ayub Khan, op. cit., p. 200.

²⁹Ibid., p. 208.

³⁰"Pakistan," Time, Vol. 82, 13 Sep. 1963, p. 42.

³¹Muhammed Ayub, op. cit., p. 24.

³²Denney, op. cit., p. 12.

³³Mujahid, op. cit., p. 33.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid., p. 35.

maritime power, while Pakistan relies on the sea lines of communication between its two parts.³⁶

This changing scene led Ayub to make the statement:

If India attacked Pakistan or Pakistan-held Kashmir on the excuse that she was 'recovering' what she claims to be 'Indian territory,' our people fear that the great powers might again be either unwilling to intervene out of consideration for their global policies or unable to thwart Indian aggression.³⁷

At the same time that its fear of attack from India was increasing, Pakistan found itself in an economic vise, for without foreign economic aid, most of which came from the US, Pakistan's economy would very nearly collapse.³⁸ Pakistan had no technological background, its only engineering college had been built before partition, its manufacturing capacity in 1965 was less than \$1 billion, it uses only 600 megawatts of power,³⁹ it is poor in resources and skill and is backward in agriculture, it requires the import of food, it has a very low annual per capita income, and underemployment is still the rule.⁴⁰

Foreign aid is of vital importance to any continued economic growth. In 1964, for example, such aid amounted to 40% of total investment and covered the cost of 66% of imports.⁴¹ Pakistan's

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Ayub Khan, op. cit., p. 208.

³⁸Percival J. Griffiths, "Political and Economic Conditions in South Asia," Royal Central Asian Journal, Vol. 51, Oct. 1964, p. 223.

³⁹Abdus Salam, "Pakistan--The Case for Technical Development," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 20, Mar. 1964, pp. 3-5.

⁴⁰Denney, op. cit., p. 1.

⁴¹Barbara Ward, "Pakistan's Ambitious Planners," Economist, Vol. 215, 5 Jun. 1965, p. 1143.

third 5-year plan will require even more foreign aid to meet trade deficits.⁴²

One further complication is the heavy dependence of Pakistan on the US for spare parts, particularly for military equipment.⁴³

Under the circumstances, the West could not expect Pakistan's foreign relations to remain unchanged. Pakistan's relations with both the West and the communist nations are based on its national interest and on changing international conditions.⁴⁴ Since Pakistan's commitment to the West had always been only partial and not always enthusiastic and since Pakistan considers its commitment to Islam as protection against Communism,⁴⁵ both the USSR and Communist China were possible new sources of support.

The USSR, however, was not a promising one. It had been hostile, or at best neutral, toward Pakistan from the beginning.⁴⁶ With the advent of the alliance between the US and Pakistan, relations between the USSR and Pakistan deteriorated: the USSR sent a number of notes of protest, it supported Afghanistan against Pakistan, and, most significantly, it changed its policy on the Kashmir issue to favor India.⁴⁷ Moreover, Pakistan probably feels that the USSR's attitude toward Indian preeminence in the area is at least as unfavorable as that of the US.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³"Ending the Suspense," Time, Vol. 86, 17 Sep. 1965, p. 46.

⁴⁴Levi, op. cit., p. 211.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 213.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 215.

China was a different matter. Before 1962, Pakistan saw little prospect of support from China against India, but the Chinese invasion of India in October of that year changed the power arrangement in South Asia. First, of course, it put China and India on opposite sides. Second, it caused the US to begin military aid to India over Pakistan's protests.⁴⁸ As a result during 1963 Pakistan's relations with China were growing closer, although President Ayub stated that he would not sign any military pacts with China and would remain a US ally.⁴⁹

Even before the Indo-Pakistan War in the Fall of 1965, Pakistan's shift toward China was evident from a number of its actions:⁵⁰

1. They signed agreements covering their borders, civil aviation, and trade.
2. They exchanged visits of ranking officials.
3. China made a \$60 million loan to Pakistan.
4. Pakistan had made diplomatic overtures to Indonesia, then one of China's followers.

Besides the recent events showing a shift toward China, Pakistan in the past has consistently been friendly toward China.⁵¹ It recognized China in January of 1950 and exchanged ambassadors in 1951.⁵² It has on-and-off supported China for UN membership,

⁴⁸"Pakistan," Time, Vol. 82, 13 Sep. 1963, p. 42.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰US Dept of Defense, "India and Pakistan: Crisis in South Asia," For Commanders: This Changing World, Vol. 5, 1 Oct. 1965, p. 2.

⁵¹Levi, op. cit., p. 218.

⁵²Ibid., p. 219.

failed to brand China an aggressor in Korea, and abstained on the embargo of China in the UN.⁵³ Pakistan in 1955 gave China assurances that its participation in SEATO was not directed against China and that Pakistan would not participate in "aggressive action" under the pact.⁵⁴ Today there are no matters in dispute between the two countries,⁵⁵ and Pakistan perhaps has least reason of all China's neighbors to fear attack from China.⁵⁶

China's objectives are to downgrade India as a leader in Asia, to forestall any cooperation between Pakistan and India, and to remove US influence from Asia.⁵⁷ Since Kashmir is an automatic separator of Pakistan and India⁵⁸ and since chaos on the subcontinent is precisely what China should want,⁵⁹ it is in China's interest not to obtain a Kashmir settlement. It is fortunate for China that it can accomplish this goal by supporting another opponent of India.

In Pakistan's eyes, China serves as a counter to Indian military buildup even while Western policies have favored India.⁶⁰ In addition, Chinese support would partially offset the backing of India by the USSR.⁶¹ Thus it is that Pakistan, militarily and

⁵³Denney, op. cit., p. 4.

⁵⁴"Pakistan's Relations with the People's Republic of China," Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 3, 1961, p. 219.

⁵⁵Denney, op. cit., p. 6.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 2.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 13.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 11.

⁵⁹Rowland Evans, and Robert Novak, "Cataclysm in Asia," Washington Post, 13 Sep. 1965, p. A21.

⁶⁰Mujahid, op. cit., p. 36.

⁶¹Denney, op. cit., p. 11.

industrially inferior to India, has found in China a "friend in need," a country which could and would support Pakistan in its squabbles with India and would be an effective check to future Indian designs.⁶² This is well summarized in President Ayub's reaction when he was requested to give at least token support to the US effort in Vietnam. Ayub made clear that he could give no such token without disrupting his friendly relationship with China, and that relationship, he felt, is vital as a counter to what the Pakistani see as an aggressive India.⁶³ China's support of Pakistan in repelling "Indian armed provocation," as pledged by Foreign Minister Chen Yi⁶⁴ should leave little doubt as to the nature of China's policy toward Pakistan.

While no one in Pakistan expects that China can yet contribute to the needs of Pakistan,⁶⁵ there is a group of powerful Pakistani officials, led by Foreign Minister Bhutto and Information Chief Gauhar, that is seeking closer ties with China as a means of continuing the war with India.⁶⁶ There has been a steady beat of anti-Americanism recently in government-controlled papers, and social contacts between American and Pakistani officials have all but ceased.⁶⁷ The major problem faced by Pakistan in any drift

⁶²Mujahid, op. cit., p. 36.

⁶³Chalmers M. Roberts, "LBJ-Ayub Talks Yield Little," Washington Post, 16 Dec. 1965, p. A8.

⁶⁴"Ending the Suspense," Time, Vol. 86, 17 Sep. 1965, p. 46.

⁶⁵S. M. Ali, "Ayub in China," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 47, 25 Mar. 1965, p. 547.

⁶⁶"The Cry of the Hawks," Time, Vol. 86, 15 Oct. 1965, p. 38.

⁶⁷Ibid.

toward China, however, still remains the hard fact that China has no acceptable answer to Pakistan's economic and political problems and cannot provide a satisfactory substitute for Pakistani collaboration with the US.⁶⁸

In summary, Pakistan's alliance with the West was brought about as the only course then open to counter India. With the recent shifts in US policies toward the subcontinent and with the break between China and India and between China and the USSR, Pakistan sees a new situation to offset its inferiority with respect to India. This shift toward China, however, has been kept partially in check by Pakistan's vital need of US aid to maintain and improve its economy.

⁶⁸"An Important Visit," Washington Post, 14 Dec. 1965, p. A16.

CHAPTER 3

INDIAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

Prime Minister Shastri voiced the prime concern of India, and all nations, recently when he stated: "As for the future, I can only say that the preservation of the security and integrity of the country is our first and foremost consideration."¹ Second to this as a guide for India is its well-known concept of nonalignment.² Next is its position on Kashmir, which Shastri made clear by saying: "This is an integral part of India."³

Coupled with these fairly concrete policies are a group of emotional ones which have a heavy impact on Indian actions:

1. India, after the 1962 defeat by China, found itself a third rate power. This left it an intolerable sense of national inferiority, insecurity, and impotence and a strong desire for national self-assertion.⁴

2. An emotional hatred and distrust of Pakistan has developed, based on the religious conflicts of the Hindu and Moslem, as discussed in chapter 1.

¹Selig S. Harrison, "Shastri Insists India Will Hold Kashmir 'Bulge,'" Washington Post, 23 Nov. 1965, p. A24.

²"Shastri US Trip Date Open," Washington Post, 22 Nov. 1965, p. A6.

³Ibid.

⁴Donald S. Zagoria, "India's 1962 Rout Shapes Kashmir War," Washington Post, 18 Sep. 1965, p. A15.

3. India is generally indifferent to Africa and most of Asia.⁵

4. India, particularly in its press, has used Britain and the US as whipping boys, while at the same time the USSR is emerging in India's eyes as its only true friend.⁶

Once Pakistan joined CENTO, the USSR supported India in its dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir, unlike the US, which tried to satisfy both sides.⁷ This unwavering Soviet support of India in the UN,⁸ coupled with the fact that Pakistan faced India with US-supplied arms,⁹ has resulted in Shastri paying tribute to the USSR after the recent hostilities: "It would be impossible for India to forget the way in which they have helped us during a difficult period."¹⁰

In addition, the USSR has provided considerable economic and military aid to India, but India must still look to the US for the bulk of such aid. For example, at the time of the recent Indian-Pakistani war there was a total of \$556 million of US aid in various stages of approval for India.¹¹ Moreover, an average of 300,000

⁵Chester Bowles, "Return to India: The Ambassador's View," New York Times Magazine, 10 Nov. 1963, p. 20.

⁶Selig S. Harrison, "India Leaning Toward Russia, Away from US and Britain," Washington Post, 13 Sep. 1965, p. A16.

⁷Selig S. Harrison, "India Pays Tribute to Russia, Rejects South Asia Summit," Washington Post, 17 Nov. 1965, p. A17.

⁸Selig S. Harrison, "India Leaning Toward Russia, Away from US and Britain," Washington Post, 13 Sep. 1965, p. A16.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Selig S. Harrison, "India Pays Tribute to Russia, Rejects South Asia Summit," Washington Post, 17 Nov. 1965, p. A17.

¹¹Richard Halloran, "US Weighs Pressure on Kashmir Foes," Washington Post, 15 Sep. 1965, p. A17.

tons of US wheat has been sent to India monthly since 1960.¹² From this it is apparent that India cannot do without US aid much better than Pakistan, for India is dependent on economic assistance.¹³

This economic dependence of India on the US and the explicit military dependence on both the US and the UK¹⁴ undoubtedly is partly responsible for the unfavorable attitude of the Indians for the US.

While its relations with the USSR and the US have been evolving rather slowly over the past 20 years, India's relations with China changed abruptly with the border war of 1962. As discussed in chapter 2, prior to the war, India's friendly relations with China made any attempt by Pakistan to count on Chinese assistance seem useless. Not only had India supported Chinese interests, but also it had signed with China in 1954 a treaty on Tibet which pledged non-aggression and respect for territory of the other.¹⁵

So it was that in 1962 Nehru felt that China had committed premeditated aggression on India.¹⁶ China claimed that India's borders were invalid because they were laid down by Britain,¹⁷ but

¹²Evarice C. Mire, India vs. Pakistan: The Roots of Dispute and Possible Courses of US Action, p. 67.

¹³Percival J. Griffiths, "Political and Economic Conditions in South Asia," Royal Central Asian Journal, Vol. 51, Jul.-Oct. 1964, p. 222.

¹⁴Selig S. Harrison, "India's Dilemma: The Air Defense," Washington Post, 23 Feb. 1963, p. A8.

¹⁵Jawaharlal Nehru, "Changing India," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 41, Oct. 1963, p. 457.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Olaf Caroe, "India and Pakistan," Royal Central Asian Journal, Vol. 51, Apr.-Jun. 1964, p. 116.

India considered that China's behavior had shown utter disregard for good international behavior, thus shaking India's former confidence in China's good faith.¹⁸ The Himalayan barrier had proved vulnerable.¹⁹

With India one of the two Asian countries which could become effective counterweights to China,²⁰ China was bound to reach a point where it would attempt to downgrade India's position of leadership in Asia. This forced India into a position where it was no longer nonaligned regarding China.²¹ Nehru said of China in 1962: "We cannot, on the available evidence, look upon her as other than a country with profoundly inimical intentions toward our independence and institutions."²² Shastri echoed these words when he said that China "does not seem to believe in peace and peaceful methods" anywhere in Asia. Shastri also said:

Chinese expansionism undoubtedly poses a continuing danger not only to India but to other countries in Southeast Asia as well. . . . India is an unbearable example to the Chinese, and their overvauling ambitions can be thwarted only by a strong and stable India.²³

The Colossus-of-the-North in Asia was beginning to worry the weaker and less militant Indians.

¹⁸Nehru, op. cit., p. 458.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Bowles, op. cit.

²¹Ibid.

²²Nehru, op. cit., p. 458.

²³Selig S. Harrison, "Shastri Insists India Will Hold Kashmir 'Bulge,'" Washington Post, 23 Nov. 1965, p. A24.

CHAPTER 4

MAJOR US SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE SUBCONTINENT

The 16th of October 1964 was a day that changed history, for it was the day that China signified to the world that it was a nuclear power--the first in Asia.

The early detonation of a U-235 device made it clear to the West that China had given high priority to becoming a nuclear power and had devoted a substantial amount of its scarce resources to the program.¹

The New China News Agency announcement made clear the meaning of this detonation when it stated that development was ". . . for defense and for protecting the Chinese people from the danger of the United States launching a nuclear war."² In short, China was developing a deterrent against attack by the US, probably by threatening Asian cities.³ The Chinese view is that the more Socialist states which have nuclear weapons, the more successful the deterrent is likely to be, a view similar to that advanced by both Britain and France.⁴

In addition to this deterrence of the US, China had a number of other motives for developing nuclear weapons:⁵

¹Morton H. Halperin, "China and the Bomb," Military Review, Vol. XLV, Aug. 1965, p. 25.

²Ibid.

³"Red China's Nuclear Threat: The Time Grows Shorter," US News and World Report, Vol. 58, 31 May 1965, p. 29.

⁴Halperin, op. cit.

⁵Ibid., pp. 26-27.

1. It reduces dependence on the USSR.
2. It increases Chinese influence in the Communist Bloc.
3. It increases Chinese ability to establish hegemony in Asia.
4. It provides China with great prestige.
5. It reinforces Chinese military power.

To supplement its conventional military threat to Asia and to make the most of this newly developed technology, China undoubtedly wants missile delivery systems with which to frighten its neighbors and to speed up its drive to dominate Asia.⁶ With this in mind China appears to be giving high priority to mid-range missiles, which could appear by 1968.⁷

Already gravely threatened by an aggressive China, as discussed previously, India will feel especially threatened by this new Chinese capability to destroy Indian cities. This new threat to its security ultimately could cause India to become more susceptible to the spread of Chinese Communist influence.

At the same time the basic interest of the United States in the Indian subcontinent is the prevention of the spread of Communism into India or Pakistan,⁸ the two nations which connect the strategic Middle East with the battleground of Southeast Asia. These two

⁶"Red China's Nuclear Threat: The Time Grows Shorter," US News and World Report, Vol. 58, 31 May 1965, p. 29.

⁷Ibid., p. 28.

⁸Stanley Y. Kennedy, Jr., Kashmir Dispute--Appropriate Role of the United States, p. 37.

nations, lying behind the mountain barriers on their northern borders, block or threaten any move south by the USSR or China and control the land and sea routes from Asia to Europe and Africa.⁹

India is the key country in South Asia. Its course economically and politically in the next decade will determine the future of the area¹⁰ and will be of great importance to the Free World for a number of reasons:¹¹ the world influence which India has achieved since her independence; its role as a mediator, particularly between the East and the West; its example of a free and independent government in Asia; and its demonstration to the underdeveloped world that there is an alternative to totalitarian methods of economic growth. It is this pivotal role of India which has persuaded Pakistan that neither the US nor the USSR will make major decisions which are counter to India's interests.

Pakistan, on the other hand, is allied with the US and could play a leading role in the economic and political stabilization of South Asia,¹² but its much smaller size and wealth and its less dominant position keep it from having the importance to the area that India has.

Deriving from its basic interest in the area are two prime objectives for the US:

⁹ US Dept. of State, Department of State 1963, p. 93.

¹⁰ Colon Associates, "United States Foreign Policy - Asia," in United States Foreign Policy, US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, pp. 427-428.

¹¹ Leonard L. Keene, The Strategic Importance of India to the Free World, pp. 66-67.

¹² Kennedy, op. cit., p. 35.

First, to develop India as a political and economic counter to China.¹³

Second, to build both India and Pakistan into strong, independent countries which can resist Communist aggression.¹⁴

In order to try to bring about these two objectives, the US has tried to improve the economic conditions of both countries, as pointed out in chapters 2 and 3. The US has done this to improve the standard of living in both countries, which today have an annual per capita income of about \$75 for India and \$45 for Pakistan.¹⁵

In addition, the US has attempted to create effective military forces to support the US objective of resisting Communism. India refused military aid initially, but it reversed this policy after the Chinese invasion of 1962 in order to accept over half a billion dollars in US military aid.¹⁶ Meanwhile, Pakistan has been receiving military aid from the US for nearly 15 years and has become a key element in the CENTO and SEATO alliances.

Because of the dispute between them, both India and Pakistan react unfavorably toward the aid which is given to the other.¹⁷ In fact, from the standpoint of US image, military aid does more harm than good in the area. Prime Minister Shastri said recently:

¹³Chester Bowles, Ambassador's Report, p. 391.

¹⁴Kennedy, op. cit., p. 37.

¹⁵Gerald L. Steibel, "The Strange Story of India and Pakistan," The American Legion Magazine, Vol. 79, Dec. 1965, p. 51.

¹⁶Evarice C. Mire, India vs. Pakistan: The Roots of Dispute and Possible Courses of US Action, p. 67.

¹⁷Kennedy, op. cit., p. 39.

"But if, despite the recent experience, the US should rearm Pakistan, well, then it could impose a severe strain on our relations."¹⁸ On the other hand President Ayub has stated: "A massive Indian military build-up would further imperil the existing precarious balance of power in this area."¹⁹ Pakistan has made it clear to the US that military aid to India was a betrayal of Pakistan.²⁰

In order to make the US aid both more effective and more acceptable to both countries, whether it be military aid to protect the subcontinent against the external threat of China or the USSR or economic aid to build the internal strength of the countries, a key US interest in the area must be the settlement of any disputes between India and Pakistan. Without mutual trust between these countries, they will continue to waste their energies in preparing for or carrying on conflicts with each other.

Today the Kashmir dispute is the most important issue preventing a solid front against the Communist nations to the North,²¹ but it should be remembered that Kashmir is important primarily as a symbol. Settlement of the Kashmir dispute itself may pave the way for better relations between the two countries; but, unless a Kashmir settlement leads to the ultimate development of trust between them, India and Pakistan will remain fearful of each other and of any efforts

¹⁸"Shastri US Trip Date Open," Washington Post, 22 Nov. 1965, p. A6.

¹⁹Ayub Khan, "The Pakistan-American Alliance," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 42, Jan. 1964, p. 209.

²⁰"Pakistan," Time, Vol. 82, 13 Sep. 1963, p. 42.

²¹Kennedy, op. cit., p. 37.

to strengthen the other. Conversely, a continued stalemate in Kashmir would not be of great importance if the basic fears of each country regarding Kashmir could be allayed.

Basically, then, all the US interests in the area are served by three actions:

1. Encouraging economic growth.
2. Maintaining effective military forces against Communist invasion or nuclear blackmail.
3. Settling disputes, particularly the fundamental one of mutual distrust and fear.

CHAPTER 5

POSSIBLE INDIAN REACTIONS TO CHINESE NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT

The entry of China into the small circle of nuclear-capable nations requires a careful reassessment by all of China's neighbors of their relations with China, but particularly by the nations of India and Pakistan.

The traditional Indian policies can be summarized as non-alignment, nonproliferation and universal disarmament. It was on these policies that India built its leadership of the nonaligned nations of the world. With the Himalayan barrier separating India from China and with both the US and the USSR providing conventional support to India as a counter to Chinese expansion to the south, these policies were sound, particularly since Nehru considered India a military match for China in a conventional war on the subcontinent.¹ However, the increased capabilities of the Chinese in the next few years to destroy India's cities and industries as well as to support Chinese armies must be considered in determining India's policies for the future.

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a consideration of five major courses of action open to India. While there are a large number of variations which might be considered in determining

¹Arthur S. Lall, "The Political Effects of the Chinese Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 21, Feb. 1965, p. 22.

specific policies, these courses were selected as being separate and distinct from one another, reasonably logical or feasible, and a full range of courses.

Alternative A - Return to pre-1962 policies

1. Remain nonaligned.
2. Keep military expenditures at a minimum to meet local border incursions or threats from Pakistan.
3. Attempt to reach a new detente with China.

This alternative would require few of India's scarce resources and would continue its traditional policies, permitting India's continued leadership of nonaligned countries. However, such a return to the past ignores the Chinese military threat to India and, therefore, is counter to at least a significant part of Indian public opinion. Such an alternative is a very high risk course of action for India to adopt in the face of recent Chinese belligerency.

Alternative B - Continue the present policies of the Indian Government²

1. Remain nonaligned.
2. Continue to build up conventional forces, seeking assistance of all major powers, including the US, UK, and USSR, to do so.
3. Organize world opinion, in the UN and outside, against Chinese policy and try to isolate China.

²Raj Krishna, "India and the Bomb," India Quarterly, Vol. 21, Apr.-Jun. 1965, p. 121.

4. Cease lobbying for seating of China in the UN.

5. Try to persuade all nuclear powers to guarantee the security of nonnuclear nations against nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail.

6. Refuse to develop nuclear weapons.

a. Because India cannot afford nuclear armament in lieu of economic development.

b. Because of India's dedication to peace and its work for disarmament.

c. Because India opposes proliferation as increasing the risk of war.

This alternative would continue India's traditional policies, permitting it to continue leadership of the nonaligned nations. In addition this alternative would attempt to counter Chinese conventional capabilities, relying on outside forces to counter Chinese nuclear capabilities. Moreover, it would avoid nuclear proliferation.

Its major disadvantage lies in its reliance on highly uncertain nuclear guarantees and world opinion, rather than Indian capabilities, to counter Chinese nuclear power. In addition it requires a considerable expenditure of scarce resources, at the same time depending on foreign assistance, to increase conventional Indian capabilities.

Alternative C - Align itself fully with either the US or the USSR

1. Join Western or Communist alliance.
2. Build up conventional forces with help of Allies.

3. Maintain as much flexibility in foreign affairs as possible under the constraints of the new alliance.

4. Rely on nuclear capabilities of allies to counter Chinese capabilities.

Such an alternative provides a positive counter to Chinese capabilities while avoiding any proliferation of nuclear weapons. It would have the added advantage of requiring only limited Indian resources for military purposes, obtaining maximum outside help from allies.

This alternative, however, would signal the end of India's traditional role of nonalignment and forego any leadership of non-aligned countries. Also, it would require a decision between the US and the USSR, foregoing, at least in the near future, the assistance of the other. Both of these actions would be counter to the views of significant portions of Indian public opinion.

An additional disadvantage of this course would be its reliance on allies rather than on Indian capabilities.

Alternative D - Demonstrate a nuclear capability

1. Would be an extension of one of the preceding alternatives.

2. Provide for a development program of a nuclear device only, probably under the guise of "peaceful" use of nuclear energy.

3. Do not develop weaponization or delivery means, at least at the present time.

Selecting this alternative would make India a nuclear power, with the attendant prestige of such a position, and would balance

the psychological impact of the Chinese detonations. While not unduly expensive in resources, it would provide India with the technology, under its own control, for nuclear arms should they be required at a later date.

However, this alternative does not actually change military power and, except for prestige and advanced technology, carries with it the same disadvantages as the alternative which it extends. It would be a form of nuclear proliferation and, therefore, counter to India's traditional policies. Moreover, it would worsen relations with Pakistan. Though popular with some elements of the Indian population, it is likely to create internal political problems both with those opposed to nuclear weapons and with those in favor of them.

Alternative E - Develop an independent deterrent force

1. Launch a program to develop and produce nuclear warheads and delivery systems.

2. Would be an extension of one of the preceding alternatives.

The greatest advantage of this alternative rests in its providing an Indian counter to Chinese or other nuclear threats without increased reliance on either the US or the USSR. India would be a nuclear power in the true sense and would have this power under its own control, which may deter both nuclear attacks and some conventional confrontations.

The cost to India would be heavy, requiring a heavy allocation of resources for the nuclear force and for the accompanying conventional

buildup which India would need if more than an all-or-nothing option is to be available in dealing with China. The proliferation would be counter to India's traditional policies and to a significant part of the Indian public opposed to nuclear weapons. Moreover, this great capability would worsen relations with Pakistan and probably with most of the developing countries of Africa and Asia.

CHAPTER 6

COURSES OF ACTION AVAILABLE TO PAKISTAN

In developing feasible courses of action for Pakistan a number of factors, discussed in chapter 2, must be borne in mind, since they limit the number of courses which are available realistically:

1. Pakistan's foreign policy is preoccupied with India and the fear of Indian attack.
2. Past relations with the US have been based to a large degree on the fact that the US was the only major power which would provide military aid to Pakistan.
3. Pakistan's membership in SEATO and CENTO were more preconditions to US aid than genuine acceptance of an anti-Communist alliance.
4. Past relations with China have been generally friendly with no outstanding disputes; however, until the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, Pakistan considered that Chinese-Indian relations were too friendly to permit Pakistan to have any hope of Chinese support against India.
5. Although the Tashkent meeting may signal some movement back toward a neutral course between Pakistan and India by the USSR, Pakistan's membership in CENTO and the Soviets' firm support of India's position on Kashmir preclude movement toward the USSR as protection against India.
6. Pakistan places great store in its relations with other Moslem countries, but the poverty and impotence of any

possible Moslem alliance preclude any reliance on aid from Moslem sources.

7. Lastly, Pakistan's great reliance on aid for economic development and its lack of scientific facilities make development and production of nuclear weapons by Pakistan impossible for the foreseeable future.

Alternative A - Return to close ties with the Western Allies

1. Support US actions and positions.
2. Request continued US military aid to increase conventional capability.
3. Minimize contacts with China.

Under this alternative Pakistan would be protected by the US against encroachment from China or the USSR and would receive US military aid, thus reducing demands on Pakistan's resources to the lowest level possible. This alternative also would create the most favorable ties with the US, probably increasing economic aid.

Balanced against this would be the complete reliance on the US, which has shown itself highly unreliable when India is involved, and the breakdown of ties with China, the one power which has supported Pakistan fully against India. Moreover, selection of this alternative would likely result in ending any further activity on the Kashmir problem but would counter India indirectly and to a limited degree.

Alternative B - Continue ties with the West while cultivating Chinese friendship

1. Maintain position within the Western alliances.

2. Build up conventional force, receiving military aid as possible.

3. Develop a flexible foreign policy within the confines of the alliances.

4. Seek further means of normalizing relations with China, seeking its continued support of Pakistan in disputes with India.

This alternative would maintain Pakistan's relations with the US, continuing US economic and military aid and US protection against encroachments by the USSR or China. At the same time it would provide for ties with China, which might be needed in future crises with India. In other words, Pakistan would achieve some of the freedom of action which nonaligned countries have.

Moreover, this alternative would at least partially counter India, while probably keeping the Kashmir issue alive.

On the other hand this alternative would reduce the closeness of ties with the US while still relying to a great degree on the US both militarily and economically. It would require substantial Pakistani resources to make up any aid which the US failed to provide, but it would not provide Chinese military backing of Pakistan against India.

Alternative C - Seek increasing ties with China short of loss of economic aid

1. Develop cultural, economic, and, to the degree practical, military ties with China.

2. Continue to receive Western economic aid.

3. If possible, withdraw from Western alliances.
4. Build up conventional forces, with aid from any sources available.

This alternative brings Pakistan closer together with China, the one major power which is not attempting to assuage India at the same time, and counters India directly, though not completely. It brings Pakistan into the area of nonaligned countries, while still recognizing the continuing need of Pakistan for Western economic aid.

Such actions may, however, force the US and India into building India militarily and remove any Western support for Pakistan's position on Kashmir. With the ending of US military aid, Pakistan would have to allocate large amounts of its own resources to conventional armament. Lastly, Pakistan would run some danger of Chinese domination while relying on only a community of interests with China in any crisis with India.

Alternative D - Seek full alliance with China

1. Seek formal military alliance with China, coupled with cultural and economic ties.
2. Accept loss of Western aid, trying to replace it from Communist countries.
3. Dissolve all connections with Western alliances.
4. Build up conventional forces, obtaining whatever aid China or other Communist countries will offer.

This alternative provides strong nuclear and conventional counters to India, principally because it gives Pakistan the

greatest assurance of Chinese assistance against India. It may even permit Pakistan to force settlement of Kashmir, in conjunction with Chinese pressure.

Conversely, this alternative ends greatly needed Western economic aid, requiring heavy allocation of resources by Pakistan to meet military requirements and economic development. It probably ends all Western support of Pakistan's position on Kashmir and may force India and the US into a military agreement or alliance. It certainly will put heavy pressure on Pakistan to communize the nation and runs strong danger of domination by China of Pakistan. At this point Pakistan may have traded possible Indian domination for possible Chinese domination.

CHAPTER 7

WHICH WAY WILL THEY TURN?

Having established several courses of action which are open to both countries, the next question becomes which course is each most likely to adopt.

Pakistan, preoccupied with India, certainly will weight Indian actions and policies heavily in selecting a course for Pakistan to follow. The attitudes of the US, China, the USSR, and other countries will play a significant role in the selection, of course, but in the final analysis Pakistan's position will be reactive to Indian policy.

India, on the other hand, will pay much less attention to Pakistan's policies in determining the best course for India, because Pakistan's threat to India is essentially emotional and symbolic, while the threat from China is much more real from a military and political point of view. The combination of the 1962 border war with China, the 1964 detonation of a Chinese nuclear device, and the Chinese threats to India during the 1965 war with Pakistan forces India to base its policies largely on Chinese actions, in particular on the Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapon capability. In the long run the differences between real alternatives available to India are only in regard to the means of balancing Chinese power.¹

¹Raj Krishna, "India and the Bomb," India Quarterly, Vol. 21, Apr.-Jun. 1965, p. 120.

Three undeniable facts face India: China is a nuclear power, China has or will soon have the means to use these weapons against Indian cities, and China has shown animosity to India as a rival for power in Asia. Against the background of this nuclear threat to India, the most important single decision facing India, and the one which will probably have the greatest impact throughout the world, is whether or not India too shall become a nuclear power.

That India has the ability to join the nuclear club there is no doubt. Intelligence sources have indicated that only 12 to 18 months would be required,² while the late Indian AEC chairman, Dr. Bhabha, has suggested 18 months from the decision.³ Moreover, Dr. Bhabha, who was powerfully convinced that the West would never risk nuclear intervention in Asia,⁴ estimated that the Chinese capacity is about 30 to 50 bombs a year, which India might be able to match at under \$100 million annually.⁵ Final cost of weapons and delivery means have been estimated at about 7% of GNP⁶ for India if it is to have a true nuclear force. For a nuclear device to be detonated in 18 months, observers consider that the cost would be less than \$10 million, probably using plutonium from the Trombay reactor.⁸

²Marquis Childs, "To Be Number 6: India's Decision," Washington Post, 15 Nov. 1965, p. A20.

³"Demand for Indian A-Bomb Expected as Aftermath of Chinese Explosion," Washington Post, 17 Oct. 1964, p. A11.

⁴Selig S. Harrison, and Howard Simons, "117 Die as US-Bound Jet Hits Mont Blanc," Washington Post, 25 Jan. 1966, p. A3.

⁵Childs, op. cit.

⁶"India is Expected to Build Nuclear Weapons," Washington Post, 7 Oct. 1965, p. G10.

⁷J. Anthony Lukos, "Shastri Resists Call for A-Bomb," New York Times, 20 Oct. 1965, p. 1.

⁸Ibid.

Even though his country had the necessary ability to become a nuclear power, Prime Minister Shastri refused to build such a device, relying instead on the guarantees of the US and the USSR.⁹ As late as 19 October 1965 he said that India would not build a nuclear bomb despite growing pressures to do so.¹⁰ Even so, Shastri also stated that the decision by India not to produce a nuclear weapon would have to be reconsidered if China developed a nuclear delivery system,¹¹ presumably an MRBM.

The pressure for the bomb is expected to increase.¹² Shastri failed at Cairo to have nonaligned nations put pressure on China against developing nuclear weapons.¹³ Following the recent war with Pakistan and the accompanying ultimatum from China, there has been an increasing clamor in the press and in political circles for India to build a bomb.¹⁴ Indian papers have stated that India cannot count on either the US nor the USSR indefinitely.¹⁵

Great pressures are being applied in the political field. Eighty-six members of the Indian Parliament from almost all parties submitted a letter in September 1965 demanding the start of construction of nuclear weapons.¹⁶ The letter stated in part: "India's

¹⁰Lukos, op. cit.

¹¹Selig S. Harrison, "India Pays Tribute to Russia, Rejects South Asia Summit," Washington Post, 17 Nov. 1965, p. A17.

¹²"Demand for Indian A-Bomb Expected as Aftermath of Chinese Explosion," Washington Post, 17 Oct. 1964, p. A11.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Lukos, op. cit.

¹⁵"Demand for Indian A-Bomb Expected as Aftermath of Chinese Explosion," Washington Post, 17 Oct. 1964, p. A11.

¹⁶Lukos, op. cit.

survival both as a nation and as a democracy, in the face of the collusion between China and Pakistan, casts a clear and imperative duty on the government to make an immediate decision to develop our nuclear weapons.¹⁷ They further criticized both the US and the USSR and declared: "The security of India can no longer be left to the mercy or whim of the so-called friendly countries."¹⁸

The latter statement is very reminiscent of the arguments advanced by the French for their independent nuclear force and reflects a considerable number of Indian views. Prime Minister Nehru in 1963 pointed out that the defense of India in the long run calls for sustained effort by India itself.¹⁹ He summed it up by saying of India: "It is learning that in the world today it is not enough to be devoted to peace or to mind one's own affairs, but that it is also necessary to have adequate armed strength. . . ."²⁰ Raj Krishna, writing in the India Quarterly, considers that limited nuclear armament has become an inescapable requirement for preserving real independence, which is the core of nonalignment.²¹

Part of the drive toward Indian nuclear arms stems from the national insecurity and inferiority mentioned in chapter 3. Unless India becomes a nuclear power, it must rely on protection by the US

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Selig S. Harrison, "War a Tonic to India," Washington Post, 26 Sep. 1965, p. E1.

¹⁹Jawaharlal Nehru, "Changing India," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 41, Oct. 1963, p. 459.

²⁰Ibid., p. 462.

²¹Krishna, op. cit., p. 129.

and the USSR, thus having the status of a second or third rate power. Moreover, India has a very real fear of a rapprochement between Moscow and Peking,²² which would mean full dependence on the West if China continues to try to dominate Asia.

If India could count on the friendship of China, as it did before the 1962 border war, India could accept a policy with Moscow and Peking on one side and the West on the other; but China has become too aggressive to permit such a policy. In recent years China has forcibly occupied Tibet, violated the Indian border more than 40 times, and seized nearly 15,000 square miles of territory. Moreover, China has the world's largest land army and militia and the only nuclear weapons in Asia.²³ To add to this dark picture, India sees Pakistan with a nuclear ally in China.²⁴

As can be seen, there are many pressures on India to develop at least a nuclear device, probably one which could be championed as a "peaceful" project. The late Prime Minister Shastri stated that India was studying a plan for exploring peaceful uses of nuclear energy, adding: "However, our objective is to use it only for peaceful purposes. As we develop our capability further, we may use nuclear energy in different projects, such as the building of dams, canals, tunnels, and so forth."²⁵ This might be one way around

²²Thomas F. Brady, "Indians' Anxiety Over China Rises," New York Times, 17 Oct. 1964, p. 11.

²³Krishna, op. cit., p. 120.

²⁴Howard Simons, "India Pondering Atomic Arms," Washington Post, 24 Sep. 1965, p. A20.

²⁵"Shastri US Trip Date Open," Washington Post, 22 Nov. 1965, p. A6.

some of the political and legal problems which a full development program would bring on. Also this path would avoid the heavy economic drain which the creation of a military force would require, a drain India can ill afford.

This is not a one-sided argument in India. There is a large part of the Indian population which opposes any development program. In addition to the possible abrogation of the Test Ban Treaty, there are a number of reasons for these objections to achieving a nuclear capability:²⁶

1. It would retard India's economic growth.
2. It would require scarce scientists and engineers.
3. It would require development of delivery systems to be fully effective.
4. It would require space for testing in the crowded subcontinent.
5. It would be opposed by the US, UK, and USSR, who might remove their nuclear guarantees.
6. It would stir up adverse world public opinion.
7. It would weaken India's leadership in disarmament.
8. It would add to proliferation.

One additional inhibiting factor has been the interservice rivalries in India over control of any military program.²⁷ However,

²⁶Krishna, op. cit., pp. 130-136.

²⁷Selig S. Harrison, and Howard Simons, "117 Die as US-Bound Jet Hits Mont Blanc," Washington Post, 25 Jan. 1966, p. A3.

there is speculation that the Indian Cabinet has already decided to go ahead with the program, a course favored by many prominent leaders.²⁸ This corresponds with the feeling of British experts that an Indian decision to build nuclear weapons is almost unavoidable and may already have been taken.²⁹ While developing nuclear weapons would seem irrational for a country in such dire need as India, in today's world reason may be no longer the deciding factor.

It should be noted that acquisition of a nuclear capability does not solve India's military problem with China. Such weapons today are primarily deterrents, so that India still will need conventional forces to avoid an all-or-nothing war.

For Pakistan, the crucial Indian decision will be whether or not to build a nuclear device, for even a "peaceful" detonation by India would be taken by Pakistan as a thinly concealed threat.³⁰ Once India has a demonstrated nuclear capability, Pakistan must consider that the full threat will be available should India want or need it.

If India refuses to develop nuclear weapons in the face of the Chinese threat and with the acknowledged capability of India to become a nuclear power, Pakistan probably would consider India's decision as a stabilizing influence and a step toward better understanding between the two countries. Under this situation

²⁸Lukos, op. cit.

²⁹"India is Expected to Build Nuclear Weapons," Washington Post, 7 Oct. 1965, p. G10.

³⁰Childs, op. cit.

Pakistan would undoubtedly want to maintain good relations with the US so that at least economic aid, and hopefully military aid also, would continue. At the same time Pakistan has found that its recent shift toward the East, as evidenced by various trade and other agreements with Communist countries, closer relations with neutral or left-leaning Asian powers, the Chinese border settlement and air agreement, and the Chinese loan of \$60 million,³¹ has improved relations with the USSR so that Pakistan can get the best from both East and West.³² Moreover, Pakistan would almost certainly continue to develop friendly but not close relations with China as a hedge against the future.

Should India elect to develop its nuclear technology, even if only for psychological--and "peaceful"-- purposes, Pakistan is placed in a distasteful predicament. It can accept India's predominance; it can turn to the US out of economic need and hope that the US will honor its nuclear guarantees, even against India; or it can turn to China for nuclear protection and hope to get economic aid elsewhere. Unfortunately for Pakistan, the closer are its ties with China militarily as protection against India, the harder will be the task of getting economic aid from the US.

If India becomes a nuclear power, then, Pakistan's course will be determined by a delicate balancing of factors facing it:

³¹ Sharif al-Mujahid, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Analysis," NATO's Fifteen Nations, Vol. 10, Oct.-Nov. 1965, p. 36.

³² Warren Unna, "Shastri is Going to Tashkent Meeting Reluctantly," Washington Post, 9 Dec. 1965, p. A19.

1. The immediate and long range threat from India and the urgency of countering it.

2. The status of the Kashmir dispute and any other problems that have developed with India.

3. The degree to which either the US or China could be depended upon in a crisis with India.

4. The need for and conditions of US and USSR aid.

5. The long term outlook for the US in Asia.

There is no question of Pakistan's desperate need for economic aid, but once again the emotional fear of India and the continuing tension with India over Kashmir can force reason aside and bring about decisions by Pakistan that are not rational. This will be particularly so if the US fails to recognize both Pakistan's need for security and its need for economic development. President Ayub has summed up Pakistan's dilemma: "Our position alone should be enough to bring home to Britain and America our state of desperation. Anyone who sits down and works out these things knows that their policies are really driving Pakistan against the wall."³³

33Mujahid, op. cit.

CHAPTER 8

POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON US INTERESTS

The Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons was felt directly by the US, but, in addition, it will be felt indirectly through its effects on India and Pakistan. These effects will take place in two different arenas: first in the subcontinent itself, and second throughout the remainder of the world.

Should India elect not to develop a nuclear capability, despite the threat from China, US interests would be best served both in the subcontinent and in the rest of the world, primarily because of the good will that such a decision would represent. This good will might well avoid an arms race between India and Pakistan, and it probably would result in lessened tension between the two nations, which would at least assist in the solution of disputes between them.

Avoidance of an arms race, coupled with the fact that India would not have to divert resources to its nuclear weapons program, would permit greater investment in the economies of each country, encouraging economic growth.

This Indian decision would avoid at least one country joining the nuclear club during the time when both the US and the USSR are attempting to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. In addition, India would have reinforced its position as a leader of the nonaligned countries interested in disarmament. Since India is essentially a conservative nation with many ties to the West, Indian leadership of this group of countries is desirable.

Only in the field of military strength might India's decision have an adverse effect. Even here, though, the chances are good that the ultimate effects would be what the US desires. India could be encouraged to develop a more efficient military force with greater reliance on the US. More important, India could use the reduced tensions with Pakistan to orient its forces more on China, for the US goal is not just a more effective armed force but rather a more effective one against the threat of Chinese expansion.

Pakistan, particularly, would be in a better position from the US point of view, for the Pakistani would not be faced with a possible choice between the US and China in order to counter Indian nuclear capability. While Pakistan could still be forced to make that choice at some time, the chances are much less if India has only conventional forces.

Detonation of a nuclear device by India will present the US with a greater challenge than the detonation by China. The Chinese device was a threat from a rival power in Asia, directed at the US through other Asian nations. It made the issues more clear-cut and dangerous, but it did not carry the threat to stability that an Indian device would.

Indian development of nuclear power will intensify an already dangerous struggle between two countries which the US would like to have as friends and allies. It could cause the US to have to choose between the two. It could force Pakistan into such a position that it would choose to be an ally of China against India, and thus against the US. It could cause the US to become more deeply committed to

economic and perhaps military aid to India in an attempt to maintain India's growth as a counter to China. It could result in the demise of both CENTO and SEATO if Pakistan should withdraw from these alliances. It might even give China, or at some time the USSR, a base on the Indian Ocean which could rely on overland communication for its support.

At the same time, throughout the rest of the world the addition of India to the nuclear powers would have considerable effect on the small countries which looked to India as the leader in nuclear disarmament. A new leader here would probably be much more anti-US than India has been. Moreover, additions, one by one, to the roster of nuclear powers reduce the bars to proliferation and make a decision to develop nuclear weapons easier for small but threatened countries such as Israel.

In short, the probable Indian decision to develop nuclear technology and perhaps weapons will put a heavy burden on the US to develop policies which will keep Pakistan from being driven into the Chinese camp, destroying the US defense concepts for South Asia and increasing the vulnerability of the Middle East and even Africa.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

1. Faced with an aggressive China, which has a nuclear capability, India is almost certain to develop a nuclear device, probably for "peaceful" purposes since, in this manner, the psychological, diplomatic, and scientific value could be realized at the same time that many of the economic and political problems of full weapon system development might be avoided.
2. India will count on its demonstrated capability plus US and USSR interests to deter nuclear blackmail from China, avoiding the cost of building and maintaining nuclear forces, at least for the time being.
3. After India has demonstrated its nuclear capability, Pakistan will show an ambivalent attitude toward Western aid, strongly wanting Chinese nuclear protection while needing Western economic help.
4. The closeness of Pakistani-Chinese ties will be determined by a number of factors, but principally by Pakistan's relations with India and with the US. Moreover, these relations, at least in the near future, will be reflected by the status of the Kashmir question.
5. The Kashmir dispute is artificial in that it has come to represent to both Pakistan and India the emotional problem of their national survival rather than any particular economic or political requirement.

6. Despite the probability of India electing to develop a nuclear device, it is still in the US best interest to have India not become a nuclear power.

7. In the final analysis China's acquisition of nuclear weapons could possibly result in greater fear and distrust between India and Pakistan, the downfall of CENTO and SEATO, the orientation of Pakistan on China, and the ultimate economic failure of both countries, which would signal an end to democracy on the subcontinent and much of the underdeveloped world.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the US, while continuing its efforts to stop nuclear proliferation, recognize the probability of India's development of a nuclear device and plan US policies for the changed situation in South Asia.

2. That the US recognize Pakistan's increased need for a sense of security against India by giving firm, public guarantees to Pakistan against Indian use of nuclear blackmail in the dispute over Kashmir.

3. That the US recognize the meanings behind the Kashmir dispute and attempt to solve these basic problems between India and Pakistan. This may permit a face-saving answer to be found on the Kashmir question and reduce tension between India and Pakistan.

4. That the US be careful not to place Pakistan in the position of having to choose between essential economic assistance and vitally needed military security.

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ANNEX A

A CHRONOLOGY OF KEY INITIAL EVENTS IN THE KASHMIR DISPUTE¹

3 Jun 1947 British announce intention to leave India, while creating an independent Pakistan.

18 Jul 1947 The Indian Independence Bill receives Royal Assent.

12 Aug 1947 Maharajah Hari Singh of Kashmir requests Standstill Agreements with India and Pakistan.

15 Aug 1947 Kashmir becomes an independent state.

25 Aug 1947 Rebellion against the Maharajah begins.

22 Oct 1947 Invasion of Muzaffarabad by Pakistani tribesmen.

24 Oct 1947 AZAD (Free) Kashmir Government declares itself in power. Maharajah requests military aid from India.

26 Oct 1947 Maharajah accedes to India.

27 Oct 1947 Lord Mountbatten accepts instrument of accession with the "condition" that final accession be settled by reference to the Kashmiri when law and order are restored. India airlifts troops to save Srinagar, the capitol of Kashmir.

1 Jan 1948 India files its complaint with UN Security Council, charging Pakistan with aggression.

15 Jan 1948 Pakistan places counter-complaints against India before the Security Council.

17 Jan 1948 Security Council adopts resolution requesting both governments to "cease and desist."

20 Jan 1948 Security Council creates a commission to investigate the dispute.

21 Apr 1948 Security Council creates the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP).

¹Joseph P. Stabler, Kashmir - Is There a Solution?, pp. 73-76.

5 May 1948 Regular Pakistani troops enter Kashmir.

13 Aug 1948 UNCIP adopts resolution on Cease-Fire Order and Truce Agreement, which is accepted by India and Pakistan.

1 Jan 1949 Cease-fire becomes effective.

5 Jan 1949 UNCIP adopts resolution on demilitarization and conduct of plebiscite, which India and Pakistan accept.

21 Mar 1949 UN Secretary General nominates Admiral Chester Nimitz to be Plebiscite Administrator.

20 Jun 1949 Maharajah Hari Singh deposed and leaves Kashmir.

27 Jul 1949 Cease-fire line demarcated.

17 Dec 1949 General McNaughton appointed UN representative to work out plan for demilitarization.

3 Feb 1950 General McNaughton reports failure of his mission.

14 Mar 1950 UNCIP terminated.